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Abstract 
This paper  examines the impact  of  social infrastructure on  eco- 
nomic growth by  endogenously modelling its provision  by  a  public 
sector in the context of a multi-sector growth model. Our model shows 
that not only is social infrastructure positively correlated with output 
per worker, countries that are more efficient in providing the infras- 
tructure are able to limit the level of diversion while those that are not 
are unable to do so. Next, we augment the model with human capital 
which is  endogenously determined by the education sector.  The ex- 
tended model indicates a positive link between the education and pub- 
lic sectors such that a shock to one of  these sectors affects not only the 
immediate sector but the other as well.  We also show that favourable 
social infrastructure can have positive long-term growth effects when 
the Lucas (1988) specification for the accumulation of  human capital 
is  adopted.  Our results suggest that emphasis should be placed  on 
raising the efficiency level of  the public sector and productivity level 
of  the education sector. Finally, the best way of  combating diversion 
is to encourage individuals to adopt a higher degree of  aversion to it. 
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1  Introduction 
No  individuals  exist  in  a  vacuum  within  a  society.  In every  society, we 
can invariably identify some system that shapes its identity and determines 
the way  individuals live and work.  The system can come in the form of 
cultures such as customs and traditions inherited from our ancestors, or social codes and rules created as a result of the complex web of  human interactions 
over  long periods  of  time.  The main  function of  a system, hence,  is not 
only to enable individuals to identify themselves  as a distinct  community 
through their cultures but also to govern the way individuals interact and 
work with each other through social codes and rules. To a large extent, social 
codes and rules are created to minimise the incidents of  diversive activities 
such  as predation, squatting, rent  seeking, cronyism  and extortion.  The 
fact  that every society has its own  list  of  social codes and rules suggests 
that individuals have a proclivity towards diversion; the degree of  proclivity 
may, however,  vary  across individuals.  Hence, unless some form of  social 
action can be harnessed to counter this predisposition, there will be few or no 
incentives for production to take place.  Authors who have studied the issue 
of  social action and how it affects output per worker include Olson (1965), 
Olson (1982), Baumol (1990), North  (1990), Greif and Kandel (1995), and 
Weingast (1995). Ideally, the government should be the most efficient agent 
for social action through its regulatory and legislative power.  Ironically, the 
same power  also enables it to be  a chief  instrument of  diversion through 
expropriation and corruption, for example. 
It is  important, then, that for  an economy to function well, some body 
of  system must exist  with the sole purpose  of  countering diversion.  Hall 
and Jones (1999) defined this body as social infrastructure, which is "the in- 
stitutions and government policies that make up the economic environment 
within which individuals and firms make investments,  create and transfer 
ideas, and produce goods and services."  In their empirical study involving 
cross-country regressions, they find that social infrastructure is strongly and 
positively correlated with rates of  capital accumulation, educational attain- 
ment, and productivity.  An economy with more social infrastructure enables 
more production of  output to take place because diversive activities are dis- 
couraged.  Hall and Jones (1999) identify two elements that are considered 
necessary before diversion can be successfully suppressed. The first involves 
some form of moral education where individuals learn to distinguish between 
good and evil.  The second involves the threat of  punishment.  It is obvi- 
ous that unless the threat is credible, no amount of  legislation and policies 
that constitute the threat will suppress diversive activities.  The credibility 
of  the threat in turn depends on the level of  efficiency in, and the quan- 
tity of resources devoted to, the provision of  social infrastructure.  Hence, 
there sho~ild  be some optimal mix of  resource allocation such that the right 
amount of social infrastructure is provided in every period without sacrificing 
too much of  the final good.  The optimal mix should depend on the various 
parameters that characterise the economy, such as the rate of  time preference 
of  households and the population growth rate. This  paper  contrib~~t~es  to the existing literature of  growth  theory by 
extending the single-sector  neoclassical growth rnodel formulated by  Cass 
(1965) and Koopmans (1965) to include a public sector with the sole fiinction 
of  providing social infrastructure.  Although intangible, we  rnodel social in- 
frastructure metaphorically as a stock variable that can be accumiilated over 
time just like physical and human capital. According to the Cass-Koopmans 
model, the economy can be characterised by  an aggregate production frlnc- 
tion for the final goods sector 
where Y, IC  and L denote aggregate output, total stock of  physical capital 
and raw labour respectively, and an equation of  motion for K 
where C denotes aggregate consumption and 6 measures the rate at which 
K depreciates.  The model assumes a total absence of  diversion such that 
the economy always lies on the production  possibilities frontier.  Note too 
that the differential equation for K assumes that the flow of  savings, Y -  C, 
is completely transformed into new physical capital in every period.  With 
the introduction of  the public sector, we modify the aggregate production 
function to 
Y =  AK"  (uym~)'-", 
where uy E (0,l)  denotes the fraction of productive time allocated to the final 
goods sector, and the amount of  productive time is measured by m E (0,l). 
Note that time has been normalised to unity.  The amount of  time used up in 
diversive activities is therefore measured by 1 -  m. Hence, when no diversion 
takes place, the value of  m becomes one and the economy will be producing 
on its production possibilities frontier.  Any other values of  m would mean a 
loss of  potential output. We argue that the size of  rn depends on the stock of 
social infrastructure, amongst other things, which the public sector is solely 
responsible for its provision. 
We will use the basic two-sector  model to assess several issues such as 
the relative importance of  the level of efficiency in the public sector versus 
the quantity of  resources devoted to it.  Next, we  extend the basic model 
to include human capital and examine the link between the education and 
public sectors in relation to the provision of  social infrastructure. Finally, we 
introduce a model of  social infrastructure and human capital with endogenous 
growth effects. The rest of  the paper is divided into five sections. In section 2, the basic model is developed and explained in detail. In section 3, we  present 
the steps involved in solving the model and discuss the implications of  the 
model.  In section 4, we  augment the basic model with human capital and 
discuss the implications of the model.  Section 5 introduces the endogenous 
growth model and examines the relationship between social infrastructure 
and the steady-state growth rate of  the economy.  Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
The Basic Model 
2.1  Behaviour of a Representative Individual 
The basic model consists of  a final goods sector and a public sector. The first 
sector produces goods that can be used for either consumption or investment. 
The second provides social infrastructure that is aimed at deterring diversive 
activities. We assume that every individual is identical and engages in some 
level of  diversive activity. We could instead develop a model with two groups 
of  individuals where one is strictly productive and the other strictly diversive. 
Diversion then leads to wealth transfers from the former to the latter group. 
We make the assumption that every individual is likely to engage in diversion 
since we  are more interested to examine the impact of  social infrastructure on 
the economy as a whole.  This assumption can be rationalised using a game- 
theoretic approach illustrated by  the payoff matrix in Figure 1.  The table 
captures the payoffs for two groups of players, i.e. a representative individual 
and other individuals, where each group may select from the same set of 
strategies.  These strategies are either to not engage in diversive activities 
(No Diversion) or to engage in diversive activities (Diversion).  The payoffs 
measure the marginal change to the groups' initial endowments. 
There are three possible outcomes.  In the first outcome,  both groups 
select the 'No Diversion'  strategy.  There will be no change to their initial 
endowments, no diversion will occur and no social costs will be incurred.  In 
the second outcome, one of  the groups selects the 'Diversion' strategy while 
the other stays with the 'No Diversion' strategy. The former will gain x -  T 
units while the latter will  lose x +  T  units, where x > 0 and T > 0.  The 
term z represents the private gain  (or loss) to the group arising from the 
diversive activity while T represents an explicit cost imposed on both players 
as a result of  the social cost created by the diversive activity.  This explicit 
cost could, for example, take the form of  taxes raised by the government to 
fund anti-diversive activities.  In this situation, diversion leads to a wealth 
transfer from one group to another.  This, however, is not a zero-sum game Other Individuals 
A Representative 
Figure 1: Diversion payoffs matrix 
Individual  [ Diversion 
since the two payoffs actually sum to -27.  We can view the latter term as a 
measure of  the social cost of  diversion.  Finally, in  the third outcome, both 
players select the 'Diversion7 strategy.  We  assume that the net private gain 
from diversion for  each group is zero, but both groups will  still incur the 
explicit cost of  T units each. 
It is clear that the third outcome yields the unique Nash equilibrium with 
payoffs  (-7,  -7) and the dominant strategy for both groups is 'Diversion'. 
The equilibrium outcome is worse than the case where both choose the 'No 
Diversion' strategy. This result reflects the famous Prisoners' Dilemma where 
the impossibility of  the two prisoners to monitor each other's behaviour lead 
them to select the strategy of  confession.  Here, we  =sume  that the popu- 
lation is large enough such that it is too costly for any given individual to 
monitor the behaviour of  other individuals.  Hence, it is not possible to sus- 
tain the first outcome as an equilibrium since the incentive to deviate from 
the strategy of  'No Diversion' to 'Diversion'  without being observed is too 
great for any given individual,  The problem of  diversion is therefore mod- 
elled as a matter of  how  much diversion each individual chooses instead of 
how man,y individuals choose to engage in diversion. 
We define m E (0,l)  as the fraction of  time each individual chooses to en- 
gage in market, i.e. non-diversive, activities, where the total time endowment 
is normalised to unity. Thus, 1 -  m measures the fraction of  time devoted to 
diversive activities. We shall use 1 -  m as a measure of  the level of  diversion. 
In the basic model, market activities comprise the production of  final goods, 
the transformation of  savings into productive capital, and the provision of 
social infrastructure. For simplicity, we assume that labour is required only 
in the first and last activity. We model m as a positive function of  q E (0, I), 
i.e.  the probability that an individual  gets caught for  diversion.  So, the 
higher the probability, the higher the level of  market activities engaged in, 
and the lower the level of  diversion. Specifically, 
x-2,-x-T  I  -r,-T Figure 2: The relationship between the probability of  getting caught and level 
of  market activities under different values of  the diversion aversion parameter 
where  L  > 0 measures the representative individual's degree of  aversion to 
diversive activities. We shall call this the diversion aversion parameter. 
Definition 1  We describe  the representative  individual as highly averse  to 
diversion if he or she exhibits no proclivity  towards diversion. 
A lower  L  means that for  a given value of  q, individuals will  choose a 
higher level of  rn and vice  versa since q  E  (0,l). Hence, low  L  values reflect 
high levels of  diversion aversion, and vice  versa.  We  illustrate these effects 
in Figure 2.  The figure shows that for low  L  values, the level of  m is high; 
the corollary of  that is that the level of  diversion, i.e.  1 -  m, is low.  The 
size of  L could depend on factors that are intrinsic to the individual, regional, 
cultural, social, religious, or political, for example. 
The size of  q depends on the stock of  social infrastructure (Q),  the size of the population (L), and the level of  diversion technology (D). Specifically, 
where  K  E  (0,l) and D  2  1.  Ceterzs paribus,  a higher stock of  social in- 
frastruct~ire  will  increase q  while the converse is true for  a higher  level  of 
diversion technology or population size. We argue that for a given size of  Q, 
a larger L will lower the effectiveness of social infrastructure in suppressing 
diversive activities.  This is  because when L  is  larger,  more resources are 
required  to maintain the effectiveness of social infrastructure as it is now 
harder to monitor and detect diversive activities.  Hence, it is not the size 
of  Q per se but its size relative to L that determines q. This is comparable 
to the concept of  congestion applied to physical infrastructure such as high- 
ways, power and water systems. The association between the rate of  increase 
in Q and the rate of  increase in L, however, is not onefor-one.  That is, a 
one percent increase in L does not require the same percentage increase in 
Q to maintain the effectiveness of  social infrastructure.  It requires only n 
percent. This is to allow for the possibility that Q, unlike a consllmption or 
investment good, is partially non-rivalrous.  In the extreme case where it is 
completely non-rivalrous or completely rivalrous, n would be equal to zero or 
one respectively.  We will show later that the mathematics for steady-state 
conditions provides an endogenous analytical expression for  rc. 
The diversion technology parameter, D, is an attempt to capture the level 
of  technology used by individuals in diversive activities.  An example which 
il1ustrat.e~  this parameter is the theft of  cars. Recent reports have indicated 
a significant rise in the incidents of  stolen cars.  Several studies have shown 
that the rise can be attributed to the use of  more sophisticated technology 
by  perpetrators, which reduces the probability of  getting caught  for  their 
criminal acts. Hence, a higher level of  D will enable individuals to engage in 
more diversive activities since the chances of getting caught is lower. 
2.2  The Public Sector 
The evolution of  Q in any given period is specified by the following differential 
equation: 
where G is a constant efficiency parameter (or quality index of  Q),  UQ  is the 
fraction of  m allocated to the public sector, SQ  is the rate at which existing 
Q decays, and {u,  E) E (0,l)  are elasticity parameters.  The presence of  the decay parameter, SQ, captures the idea that social infrastruct~lre  is subject 
to 'wear and tear' like physical capital in a metaphorical sense if resources 
are not continuously channelled to the provision of  new social infrastructure. 
An  example of  this is the area of law enforcement carried out by the police 
and other law  enforcement agents.  The services provided by  these agents 
represent a constituent of social infrastructure  that helps create the incentives 
for individuals to engage in market instead of  diversive activities.  In order for 
these services to remain effective, we need to supply resources continuously 
to its provision. 
The efficiency parameter, G, includes factors such as government policies, 
judicial  systems, and the level of  bureaucratic corruption, which affect the 
efficiency level of  the public sector in providing new social infrastructure. For 
example, a powerful judicial system that strives to protect property rights 
will enable law enforcement agents to carry out their duties more effectively 
since the threat of  punishment  becomes more  credible.  Another  possible 
factor suggested in Hall and Jones (1999) that could be included in G is the 
extent of  influence from Western Europe. This is because many factors that 
are conducive to having a favourable social infrastructure were  discovered 
in that region, such as the ideas of  Adam Smith, property rights, and the 
system of checks and balances in government,  Equation  (3) assumes that 
an economy with a larger  Q possesses  a better knowledge and experience 
in providing social infrastructure and hence is  able to produce more Q in 
any given  period.  It is  assumed  that the provision  of  new  Q  is  subject 
to diminishing returns with respect  to uQmL and Q individually.  We will 
show later that the mathematics for a partially non-rivalrous Q necessitates 
diminishing returns to scale with respect to uQmL  and Q jointly  as well, i.e. 
U+E<  1. 
2.3  The Final Goods Sector 
We  assume that the economy produces only one type of  final good where 
the amount produced in any given period is measured by Y.  This final good 
can be rised  for  either  consumption or  investment  and it is assumed that 
no cost is incurred when it is transformed back into physical capital,  The 
stock of  physical capital in any given period is measured by K. Using only 
labour and physical capital, the production function for Y takes the following 
Cobb-Douglas form: 
Y =  AK" (uym~)'-",  (4) 
where A  is a constant technology parameter, uy is the fraction of  m  allo- 
cated to the final goods sector,  and  E  (0,l) is an  elasticity parameter that measures the physical capital share of income.  Equation  (4) exhibits 
diminishing returns to scale with respect to K and uYmL individually, and 
constant returns to scale with respect  to K and uymL  jointly.  The above 
specification of  the aggregate production function allows us to model Y as 
a positive fu~~ction  of  m.  When individuals engage less in diversive activi- 
ties and thus more in market activities, more final goods can be produced. 
Furthermore, the assumption that diversion, when engaged in by every in- 
dividual, leads to zero net private gains implies that only market activities 
matter when it comes to the production of  real goods and the accumulation 
of  wealth.  Hence, ceteris paribus, an economy with a larger stock of  social 
infrastructure will have a higher output per worker. Note, however, that the 
economy will be operating within its production possibilities frontier as long 
as m < 1. 
2.4  The Evolution of Physical Capital 
The change in physical capital in any given period is governed by the following 
differential equation: 
where C denotes aggregate consuunption, Y -  C measures the flow of  savings, 
SK is the rate at which physical capital depreciates, and c (m)  E  (0,l) is a 
transformation coefficient which  determines the fraction of  Y -  C that is 
effectively transformed into new productive capital.  Chou and Chin (2001) 
argue that the size of  the transformation coefficient depends positively on, 
inter alia, the stock of  financial innovations  (or products) produced  in the 
financial sector.  These innovations include automatic teller machines, phone 
and internet banking systems, financial derivatives, and initial public offer- 
ings.  Although we  do not model the financial sector endogenonsly here, we 
postulate that the transformation coefficient would be a positive  function 
of  the fraction of  time engaged in market  activities, i.e.  m, which in turn 
is a positive function of  the stock of social infrastructure.  This is because a 
higher level of social infrastructure, ceteris paribus, suppresses more diversive 
activities and encourages people to engage more in market activities which 
include the transformation of  savings into productive capital.  Without any 
loss of  generality, we assume that  is a simple linear function of  m such that 3  Solving the Basic Model 
3.1  The Optimal Control Problem 
The social planner framework is used to work out the optimal solutions to 
the model.  We  adopt the conventional constant-relative-risk-aversion utility 
function for the representative individual which the hypothetical social plan- 
ner seeks to maximise by choosing the paths of  cons~lmption  and the shares of 
labour time allocated to the two sectors. Hence, the social planner's objective 
is to 
m C1-e  - 
max  u0  = 1  e-t~-n)tdt, 
c,uy  1-0 
where c =  CIL denotes consumption per worker, p > 0 denotes the individ- 
ual's subjective rate of  time preference, 0 2  0 is the risk-aversion parameter, 
and n 2  0 is the rate of  population growth, i.e.  L/L, subject to 
The Hamiltonian is 
where the control variables are c and uy; the state variables are K  and Q; 
and the costate variables are u and T. 
The first-order conditions for the control variables, i.e.  dHldc = 0 and 
dH/duy =  0, yield the follouving equations respectively: 
The first-order conditions for the state variables K and Q are given by equa- 
tions (6) and (3) respectively. The first-order conditions for the costate vari- 
ables, i.e.  -u = dHIr3K and  -7i  -- dHldQ, yield the following equations respectively: 
where k ZE  K/L. Finally, the transversality conditions are 
lim  K(t)v(t) =  0, 
t---rw 
lim  Q (t)  n (t) =  0. 
t--too 
3.2  Steady-State Conditions and Analytical Salutions 
Definition 2  The economy is on its balanced growth path  (or zn  its steady 
state) if the variables y r  Y/L,  c,  k, m, q, uy  and u~ are all constant. 
This definition provides us  the steady-state growth rate of  the model. 
Namely, Y, C and K  must all grow at rate n, and Q at rate Kn. 
Condition 3  The  parameter n  must be equal to a/  (1 -  E) in order for q =  0 
in the steady state. 
Proof. Using equation (2),  we  can write the growth rate of  q as 
Setting q =  O gives us 
Differentiating the logarithm of  the equation above with respect to time leads 
us with 
Since UQ  = q = 0 in the steady state, it must be that 
Q  ern,  --  -- 
Q  I-&' 
Hence, K must be equd to U/ (1 -  E).  I 
The model therefore provides us with  an endogenous expression for  K. 
Next, we will see the implication for the elasticity parameters, u and E, with 
regard to the assumption of  a partially non-rivalrous Q, Condition 4  The assumption of  a partially nun-riualrous Q,  i.e.  K. E (0,  l), 
necessztatcs that a  +  E  < 1. 
Proof. For  K. to lie strictly within the open interval (0,  l), we need 
Multiplying the above inequality equation by 1 -  E and rearranging then gives 
us the diminishing returns to scale requirement.  8 
We can use the definition of the balanced growth path to help generate the 
four steady-state equations that enable us to solve for the four key variables 
in the model, namely, k, c, q and UQ.  These four equations, derived from 
the steady-state conditions  k/k = 0,  l/c = 0,  G/q = 0 and Cy/uy = 0 
respectively, are 
The analytical solutions are 
I 
1 
GuciQ  (I-c)(I-KL) 
'*  =  [Dl-'  (xn  +  6,) 
1 
where Note that to get sensible predictions for q*, the exponent in the solution for 
q* needs to be strictly positive.  Given that {E,  K} E  (0, I), the restriction 
implies that 
3.3  Model Implications 
Proposition 5  Men  the  economy 2s  on its balanced  growth path,  social 
infrastructure has no impact on the growth rate of Y.  It does, however, have 
an impact when the economy 2s  on its transitional path  towards  the steady 
state. 
Proof.  Using the aggregate production function given by equation (4), 
we  can write the growth rate of  Y as 
It is clear from this equation that the growth rate of  Y  will be affected by 
social infrastructure as long as q # 0, which occurs when the economy is not 
in its steady state. 
Equation  (7) shows that if  q is increasing (i.e.  q > 0), which can arise 
from, say, a positive shock to the efficiency parameter, G, then ceteris paribus, 
the growth rate of  Y can rise above n. 
Proposition 6  If  zndividuals  are highly averse to diversion,  i.e.  the diver- 
sion aversion parameter,  L,  approaches zero,  all labour time will be  allocated 
to the final  goods  sector and no diversive  activities will take place.  On the 
other hand,  zf  individuals are  less averse, the optimal solution is to allocate 
mare labour time to the public  sector to raise the production of  social infras- 
tructure. 
Proof. We observe from the analytical solutions for ub that lim I' = 0. 
I +n  -  - 
This implies that lim ub -- 0 and lim u;  = 1.  Moreover, lim m* = 1, i.e, 
k-4  LAO  L-~O 
all labour time will be allocated to market activities only.  Next, given that 
aI'/a~  > 0 and aQ/a~  < 0, we  then have aub/a~  > 0 and au;/a~  2 0. 
When the diversion aversion parameter approaches zero, the outcome is 
comparable to the first outcome illustrated in the payoff  matrix in Figure 1, 
where both groups select the strategy of  'No Diversion'. No social costs will 
be created and the economy operates on its prodtiction possibilities frontier. When individuals are less averse, the model  attempts to increase the pro- 
duction of social infrastrtzcture by allocating more labour time to the public 
sector in the hope of  suppressing the possible surge in diversive activities, 
i.e.  to prevent  m* from falling.  The rise in  L  affects m* in two ways.  We 
have seen in Figure 2 that for a given q, the rise will decrease m. However, 
the above proposition shows that a rise in  L  will increase u;,  and given the 
analytical solution for q*, the rise in u;2  will in turn increase q*.  This im- 
plies that the net effect on m* can be a fall or rise.  The next proposition 
shows that whether m* falls continuously or rises eventually as  L  increases 
from its lower limit to its upper limit will depend on the size of  the efficiency 
parameter, G. 
Proposition 7  If the efficiency parameter,  G, is not sufficiently  above  the 
term Dl-" (Kn +  &Q), m* will be a strictly monotonically decreaszng function 
of L.  If G  is suficiently  above Dl-"  (Kn  +  6~),  m*  at first  falls  but  rises 
eventually as L  increases from zero to 1/~, 
Proof. From the first total derivative of  m* with respect to L, 
dm*  m*  [i  ln  Guy  -1,  UL d~t  -= 
d~  (1  -)  (1 -  L)  1 -  KL  (nn+ &Q)  u*Q d~ 
we need 
if we want dm*/d~  5 0 respectively.  From the previous proposition, we know 
that 6'ub/a~  > 0. Also, ln uh < 0 since uh E (0,l). Consider the case where 
L --t 0.  Taking limits on both sides, the inequality becomes 
For any given finite value of  G, it is  clear that only the less-than inequality 
sign can be satisfied. This means that dm*/d~  < 0 for low values of  L.  Now 
consider the case where  L --t 1/~.  Taking limits on both sides, we  have 
Given that -a  lnu;  > 0, the less-than inequality sign can be satisfied iff 
G is not sufficiently above  (r;n +  hQ). Conversely, the greater-than in- 
equality sign  can  be satisfied  iff G  is  sufficiently above  Dl-&  (~n  +  6&). Hence, it must be the case that drn*/d~  < 0 VL E (O,~/K)  if  G is not suf- 
ficiently above  (~n.  +  bQ).  On the other  hand,  dm*/d~  < 0 for  low 
values of  L  and dm*/d~  > 0 for  high values of  L  if  G  is sufficiently above 
DlwE  (~n  +  bQ). 
The result of  this proposition is important since it suggests that n limit 
exists as to how  high the level  of  diversion, 1 -  m*, can be over the range 
of  values for the diversion aversion parameter on the proviso of  a sufficiently 
high G. The proposition also highlights the importance of having an efficient 
public sector since an inefficient one will  not be capable of  countering the 
ill-effects of  diversion following a rise in L  in spite of  an increase in ub. Also, 
for  the turning point in the level of  diversion to exist, G has to be higher 
when the following parameters are higher: (i) diversion technology, D; degree 
of  rivalry in social infrastructure,  ti; population growth rate, n; and rate of 
decay of  social infrastnlcture, bQ. We illustrate the effects of  varying levels 
of  L  on 1 -  m* in Figure 3.  We also show the effects on output per worker, 
y*, in Figure 4. 
Assuming that G is  sufficiently high,  another implication  of  the above 
proposition is that the turning point in the level of  diversion will occur at a 
lower value of  L  when G is higher, ceteris paribus.  This means that albeit a 
sufficiently high G is necessary for dm*/d~  > 0, it is, however, not a sufficient 
condition.  This is because for any given value of  L, say L*,  dm*/d~  > 0 iff  the 
turning point occurs at LO E (0,  L*).  Hence, the likelihood that dm*/d~  > 0 
is higher when G is higher.  We illustrate this implication in Figure 5.  This 
figure also shows that for a given value of  L,  a higher G will lead to a lower 
level of  diversion and higher level of  market activities.  Naturally, one would 
postulate, in theory at least, that the level of  diversion can be completely 
suppressed by raising G to some threshold level. We illustrate this point in 
the next proposition. 
Proposition 8 In  theory, although it is  possible  to suppress diverszon to zero 
levels, i.  e. 1 -  m* -+ 0, by raising the eficiency  parameter, G, the outcome, 
however, will always be  'second best'  (in  terms of  output per worker) relative 
to the case where the diversion aversion parameter approaches zero. 
Proof. We can infer from the analytical solution for q* that m* --+  1 if 
G -+ G*, where 
Hence, diversion levels will fall to zero as G increases to G*. The analytical Level of Diversion, 1 -  m* 
When G is not sufficiently high. 
I / 
Diversion Aversion Parameter, I 
Figure 3:  The relationship between the diversion aversion parameter  and 
level of  diversion Output Per Worker, y* 
A  When G is sufficiently high. 
When G is not sufficiently high 
I 
Diversion Aversion Parameter, I 
Figure 4:  The relationship between the diversion aversion parameter  and 
output per worker Level of Diversion, 1 -  m* 
When G  is sufficiently high 
and equal to, say, G*. 
I  When G is sufficiently high 
I  dm*'  dl>  0  and  equal to, say, G** > G*.  1,  \ 
I*  Diversion Aversion Parameter, I 
Figure 5:  The relationship between  the diversion aversion parameter and 
level of diversion under different values of  the efficiency parameter solution for output per worker would then be 
However, given that u:  -+ 0 if  L  ---t  0, i,e.  u;  -+  1, output per worker will 
always be higher in the case where L --+  0 than where G --, G*.  m 
This proposition says that despite the importance of  having a high level 
of  efficiency in the priblic sector, the ideal case will always be the one where 
individuals are highly averse to diversion. When that happens, there are no 
social costs. Hence, no labour time need be taken away from the final goods 
sector to the public sector to produce any social infrastructure. The economy 
will be producing at its potential capacity. 
The Model with Human Capital 
We now consider the case where human capital contributes as an additional 
factor in the production of final goods as well as new social infrastructure. We 
augment the basic model with a third sector, namely, the education sector. 
The production of  new human capital requires raw labour as well as existing 
human capital. The equation for this sector is 
where E is  a constant productivity  parameter,  UH is  the fraction of  m al- 
located to the sector, bH is the rate at which the stock of  human capital 
depreciates, and  E  (0,l) is an elasticity parameter.  For technical reasons 
and simplicity, we let the two inputs, L and H,  exhibit diminishing marginal 
returns individually but constant returns to scale jointly in the production 
process.  Here, we  model labour and human capital as distinct rather than 
joint inputs because we want to examine how the level of human capital is de- 
termined as well as the relationship between it and social infrastructure. We 
will discuss the case of  modelling labour and human capital as joint  inputs 
in the next section. 
We argue that human capital aids the provision of  social infrastructure by 
equipping workers in the public sector with better skills thereby raising their 
ability to formulate more effective policies or strategies to counter diversive 
activities.  We  believe that a more educated workforce can lower  the level 
of  diversion not  directly but  via  its positive  impact on the public sector. 
This suggests that a positive link between human capital and the efficiency 
parameter, G, should exist.  We  can therefore write the equation of  motion 
for Q as where G  E  G (wQmH)hd  X  d (0,l) is an elasticity parameter.  The new 
efficiency parameter, G,  now only captures factors that are not related to hu- 
man capital. We will show later that the partially non-rivalrous assumption 
of  Q requires that a +  X +  E  < 1. 
We now write the aggregate production function as 
where ,fl E (0,l)  is an elasticity parameter.  Again, constant returns to scale 
is msumed across the three inputs albeit each input experiences diminishing 
returns. Note that both equations (9) and (10) collapse to their counterparts 
in the basic model when X and ,fl are both equal to zero. 
4.1  The Opt imisation Problem 
We  adopt the social planner framework to work  out the optimal solutions 
to the  model. Under the same constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function 
for  the representative individual, the hypothetical social planner  seeks to 
maximise the individual's utility by choosing the paths of  consumption and 
the shares of  labour time allocated to the three sectors.  Hence, the social 
planner's objective is to 
00  c1-8 , 
max  U~  zz 1  l ,-(~-")tdt 
1-0  C,~Y  ,UH 
subject to 
The Hamiltonian is where the control variables are c, uy and u~;  the state variables are IC, H 
and Q;  and the costate variables are v,  p and 7r. 
The first-order  conditions  for  the control  variables,  i.e.  aH/Bc = 0, 
BH/&  =  0 and BH/duH = 0, yield the following equations respectively: 
The first-order conditions for the state variables K,  H and Q are given by 
equations  (6),  (8) and  (9) respectively.  The first-order  conditions  for  the 
costate variables, i.e.  -ti  = BHIBK,  -j~  = BHIBH and -6 = BHIBQ, 
yield the following equations respectively: 
where h  ss H/  L.  Finally, the transversality conditions are 
lim  K(t)v(t) =  0, 
t+m 
lim H (t)  p (t) =  0, 
t-+m 
lim  Q(t)n(t) =  0. 
t-+m 
4.2  Steady-State Conditions and Analytical Solutions 
Definition 9  The economy is on its balanced growth path  (or in its stead3 
state) if  the variables y, c, k,  m, h,, q, uy,  UH and UQ are  all constant. 
With this definition, we have Y, C,  K  and H all growing at rate n, and 
Q at rate Kn,. Condition 10  The parameter K  must be  equal to (a  +  A) / (I -  E) in order 
for  q =  0 in the steady state. 
Proof. Using equation (2), we  can write the growth rate of  q as 
Setting q = 0 gives us 
B (uQrn)'+* L~H"Q(-'  =  bQ +  nn. 
Differentiating  the logarithm of the equation above with respect to time leads 
us with 
Since UQ  == q =:  0 in the steady state, it must be that 
Hence, tc must be equal to (cr+  A) / (1 -  E). 
The endogenous analytical expression for K  in the basic model can thus 
be viewed as a special case (i.e. X  =  0) of  the more general expression in this 
model. 
Condition 11  The assumption of  a partially  non-riva2rous  Q, 2.e.  E 
(0, l),  necessitates that a +  X  +  E < 1. 
Proof. For  K to lie strictly within the open interval (0, I),  we need 
Multiplying the above inequality equation by 1 -  E and rearranging then gives 
us the diminishing returns to scale requirement. 
We can use the definition of the balanced growth path to help generate the 
six steady-state equations that enable us to solve for the six key variables in 
the model, namely, k,  c, h, q, uw  and UQ.  These six equations, derived from the steady-state conditions k/k = 0, c/c = 0, l~/h  = 0, q/q =  0, i~~/u~  =  0 
and  ZiH/2~~  = 0 respectively, are 
The analytical solutions are where 
a  zz  p -  n + (1 -  E) (1 -   re^) (~n  +  hQ) 
(a  +  A)  L (ren +  dQ) 
1 
Note that to get sensible predictions for q*, the exponent in the solution for 
q* needs to be strictly positive.  Given that (7,  E?  re)  E (0,  l),  the restriction 
implies that 
The interval restriction for L  in the basic model is thus a special case (i.e. 
X =  0) of  the above. 
4.3  Model Implications 
Proposition 12 A fall  in the efficiency parameter, e,  or the productivity 
parameter, E,  has a negative impact on social infrastructure, human capital 
per worker and output per worker. 
Proof. We  can infer from the analytical solution for q* that a fall in G 
will decrease q*  and hence m*,  which in turn decreases h* and y*  given that 
The parameter E appears in the analytical solutions for h* and q* such that 
a fall in E will decrease these two variables and thus m*  and y*. 
We  see that a positive link exists between the education and public sec- 
tors.  A shock to any of  the two parameters, G or E, affects not  only the immediate sector but also the other, which  in turn affects the final goods 
sector.  Hence,  an economy with  low  social infrastructure  can discourage 
investments in human capital which in turn affects the provision of  social 
infrastructure and output. This result is consistent with the finding in Hall 
and Jones  (1999) where social infrastructure  is positively correlated  with 
educational attainment rates. 
Proposition 13 If  indzviduals an: less averse to diversion, i.e.  the diversion 
averszon parameter zs  higher, the optimal solution for u;  will unambiguously 
rise.  The effect  on u;l,  however, is likely to be  positive for  higher values of 
.A  and vice versa. 
Proof.  Of  the six identities in the analytical solution for uz, L  appears 
only in a.  Given that d@/d~  < 0 and i3u;ldQ  < 0, we then have du;j/i3~  > 
0.  Next, we  can infer frorn the analytical solution for uk that the sign of 
du*,/du;C, depends critically on the model parameters in A2. Assuming that 
p >  r] (n  +  hH)  and given that 
A2>Oif.A>Pu/(1--a-0). 
This proposition suggests that if  returns to human capital in the public 
sector is not sufficiently high, then it will not be attractive for individuals to 
allocat,e more time to the education sector when they become less averse to 
diversion.  As  a result, despite the rise in u;  in response to a rise in L, the 
net effect on q*, and hence m*, could be negative if  uk falls by a sufficient 
amount.  This highlights the importance of  effective utilisation of  $kills of 
public servants in order for human capital to have a positive effect on social 
infrastructure. 
The Model with Endogenous Growth 
One of  the useful things about the previous model is that it allows us to 
examine the relationship between the level of  human capital and social in- 
frastructure analytically.  We  are able to do this because human capital has 
been modelled as an input factor that can be identified distinctively from 
raw labour. Such a specification is similar to the aggregate production func- 
tion augmented with human capital introduced by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1S92) in their Neoclassical model of  economic growth.  As a consequence, the model does not exhibit. endogenous growth.  In particular, key variables 
such as output, physical capital and consumption all grow at the same rate 
as the poprilation growth rate.  In this section, we adopt a specification that 
is  similar to the Lucas  (1988) model for the human capital  accumulation 
equation. Namely, 
where, W r  hL. When m = 1, equation (11) becomes identical to Lucas's 
(1988) model.  Here, human capital and raw labour are jointly supplied by 
workers such that one is  not distinguishable from the other.  Hence, an in- 
crease in the total stock of  human  capital, H, can come about through  a 
rise in h or L or even both.  Although equation (11) describes the evolution 
of  H over time, it does not describe the individual time paths of  h and L. 
It is because of  this that an analytical study on the behaviour of  h is pre- 
cluded if  the Lucas's  (1988) specification is adopted.  Notwithstanding that, 
the latter specification enables us to analyse the relationship between social 
infrastruct~rre  and the endogenous growth rate of  the economy. 
The equation of  motion for Q now becomes 
and the aggregate production function is 
Note that the function for the probability of getting caught, q, is now written 
as 
Again, it can be shown that tc =  A/ (1 -  E), and the assumption of  a partially 
non-rivalrous Q requires that X +  E < 1. 
The optimisation problem for the social planner now is to 
subject to where Y =  AK" (uymH)'-". The Hamiltonian is 
where the control variables are C, uy and UH;  the state variables are K,  H 
and Q;  and the costate variables are Y,  p and n. 
The first-order conditions for  the control variables, i.e.  aH/aC = 0, 
BH/Buy =  0 and BH/BuN = 0, yield the following equations respectively: 
The first-order conditions for the state variables K, H and Q are given by 
equations (6), (11) and (12)  respectively.  The first-order conditions for the 
costate variables, i.e.  -i/  .=  BH/BK, -b = BH/BH  and -ir  = OH/BQ, 
yield the following equations respectively: 
where k z  K/H,  c 2 C/H. Finally, the transversality conditions are 
lim  K (t)  Y (t) =  0, 
t --+m 
lirn  H (t)  p (t) =  0, 
t-+m 
lim  Q (t)  A (t) =  0. 
t-m 5.1  Steady-State Analytical Solutions 
Definition 14  The economy is on its balanced growth path  (or in its steady 
state) if the variables y  zz Y/H,  c, k,  m, q, uy,  UH and UQ are all constant. 
We now have Y, C and K all growing at rate y;l, where y;l is the steady- 
state value of  yH = HIH, and Q at rate KT>.  The steady-state growth 
rate, yh, is endogenously determined in the model.  There are five key wi- 
ables in ths model, namely, k,  c, q, uy and UH. Using the definition of the 
steady state, we  derive the following five equations that correspond to the 
five steady-state conditions  k/k = 0, l/c = 0, q/q = 0, uy/uy = 0 and 
UH/uH  =  0 respectively: 
The analyticd solutions are 
u;  =  r (r2 +  A2) + r2  (Ti -  Ai) 
r(IQi+T2  +A2) + (Q"+T2)(Tl  -  Ai)' where 
The key variables are all functions of  the model parameters and the steady- 
state growth rate, y& = E~;lrn*-6~,  which the model is unable to provide an 
analytical expression. We can, however, use numerical simulations to obtain 
values of  ylf, that are consistent with the analytical solutions for given sets of 
parameter values. To do that, we first define the implicit function f (72) =  0, 
where 
After substituting the analytical solutions u& and m* into the above, we then 
solve numerically for the value of  y;i  that satisfies the implicit function. 
5.2  Numerical Simulations and Model Implications 
We illustrate the impact of  the efficiency  parameter, G,  productivity pararn- 
eter, E,  diversion technology, D, and diversion aversion parameter, L, on the 
steady-state growth rate, yk, of  the economy in Figure 6,  The numerical 
simulations are performed by  varying the value of  the relevant parameter 
holding other parameter values constant.  The baseline values used  for the 
model parameters are 
The simulation results show that an increase in either G or E will raise 
yk while an increase in D  or  L  will lower  7;.  In particular,  the positive 
relationship between the efficiency parameter and steady-state growth rate 
suggests that social infrastructure can have positive long-term growth effects 
in this model. Figure 6:  The impact of  the efficiency parameter,  productivity parameter, 
diversion technology, and diversion attitude parameter on the steady-state 
growth rate 
6  Concluding Remarks 
We  have developed a basic two-sector  model where social infrastructure is 
endogenously determined. We showed that unless the level of  efficiency in the 
public sector is sufficiently high, raising the share of  labour time allocated 
to that sector alone is incapable of countering the undesirable effects of  a 
rise in the diversion aversion parameter.  Although it is possible, in theory, 
to suppress diversion to zero levels, the model indicates that the outcome 
will still be 'second-best'  to the case where individuals are highly averse to 
diversion.  This is because no labour time is needed in the public sector in 
the latter case, and the economy will be producing at its potential capacity. 
When the economy is on its balanced growth path, we showed in the basic 
model that social infrastructure does not affect the long-term growth rate at 
all. However, it does have an effect when the economy is on the transitional 
path towards its steady state. Notwithstanding that, we  showed in our third 
model of  human capital that social infrastructure can lead to positive long- 
term growth effects.  In relation to output per worker, the models indicate 
that a rise in the efficiency parameter,  &, will  raise the portion  of time 
engaged in market activities whch in turn raises output per worker. We also showed in our second model how human capital can affect social 
infrastruct~ire  and vzce  versa.  An inefficient public sector will adversely af- 
fect the accumulation of  human capital thereby lowering the level of  human 
capital per worker. This in turn affects the provision of  social infrastructure 
as well  as the production of  final goods.  Alternatively, an unproductive ed- 
ucation sector adversely affects the provision of  social infrastructure thereby 
decreasing the fraction of  time allocated to market activities.  This in turn 
affects the accumulation of  human capital as well as aggregate output. The 
model also shows the importance of  effectively utilising the skills of  public 
servants if  the economy wants to encourage higher rates of  human capital 
accumulation following a rise in the diversion aversion parameter. 
We  believe that the public sector can play  a crucial role in improving 
the status of  the economy via social infrastructure.  In particular, it sl~ould 
concentrate its efforts on raising the levels of  G and E, and lowering the levels 
of  D and  L.  In particular, we  find that the economy will benefit the most 
if  individuals become more averse to diversion.  When that happens, more 
resources can be devoted to the production  of  goods and services thereby 
pushing the economy closer to its production possibilities frontier.  Finally, 
we  suggest two ways where the paper can be extended in fiiture research. 
One is to allow individuals to have heterogenous levels of  diversion aversion. 
Another is to  examine the links between social infrastructure and the financial 
and R&D sectors. 
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